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MARRIAGE AND REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES

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Abstract

Social reproduction is the perpetuation of established social hierarchies across generations. The study aimed to explore the role of homogamy in social reproduction, and co-existence of cultural and exchange modes of homogamy in the marriage market of Pakistan. We used the data of Pakistan Demographic and Health Surveys (PDHS, 1990-2013) to evaluate two conceptualized propositions. First, exchange and cultural modes of homogamy reproduce the established social and ethnic hierarchies within a marriage market, respectively. Second, these modes coexist in the marriage market of Pakistan. The results affirmed these propositions. We concluded that modes of homogamy reproduced their corresponding established hierarchies, and these modes coexisted in the marriage market of Pakistan. It is suggested that future studies should focus on the instruments of reproduction and age-cohort for a profound analysis.

1. Introduction

American and European interpretation of partner selection is based on exchange theory (Blackwell & Lichter, 2004) that argued that individuals expose their personal assets such as education, occupation and attractiveness to a marriage market, and seek partners with similar assets to exchange (Kalmijn, 1998; Lichter, 1990). Studies on homogamy –

marrying within high or equal status group (Kalmijn, 1998) – are interested to explore such exchange. Previous studies evidenced the prevalence of this exchange in western marriage market (Arum *et al.*, 2008; DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Hout, 1982; Hu & Qian, 2016; Kalmijn, 1994, 1998; Mäenpää & Jalovaara, 2015). Domański and Przybysz (2007)

affirmed the educational homogamy –marrying within equal educational group (Mare, 2016) – in 22 European countries, and Smits *et al.* (1999) found occupational homogamy in eight European countries. They defined this type of homogamy as "…the association between the occupation levels of spouses" (p. 56). However, in-caste marriages and consanguinity – marriage with second cousin or closer – have considerable importance in Asia (Bittles, 2001; Hamamy *et al.*, 2011; Hamamy, 2012). India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are significant examples of consanguinity and in-caste marriages. Bittles and colleagues (1994, 2001) found the prevalence of consanguinity in Asia (almost 55 percent). Agha (2016) stated that 20-45 percent south Indians married with close relatives which indicated the prevalence of in-caste marriages. Banerjee *et al.* (2013) studied caste-based matching in India and stated his findings as

> "the bride's side would be willing to trade off the difference between no education and a master's degree in the prospective husband to avoid marrying outside their caste…we see little interest in "marrying up" in the caste hierarchy among both men and women, but a strong preference for in-caste matching" (p. 35).

Ahmed (1986) claimed that caste is the first criterion of mate selection among Hindus and Muslims of Bangladesh because parents, having authority of mate selection for their children, prefer caste match. Pakistan also has higher prevalence of such marriages. Usman and Amjad (2013) explored the increasing trend of in-caste marriages in rural Punjab of Pakistan. Fischer (1991) studied Greentown, Lahore, and explored that 85 percent of the marriages

in the area were in-caste marriages. PDHS (2012-13) revealed that 65.4 percent women married within family. It revealed that, contrary to Europe, in-caste marriages and consanguinity are prevalent in south Asia (Agha, 2016; Alavi, 1972; Eglar, 1960; Hussain, 1999; Smits *et al.*, 1999). The difference in preferences of mate selection characteristics between western and south Asian societies can be explained by focusing on the differences in their openness in which two factors are considerably consistent. First, western societies have higher number of coeducational institutes which is a significant marriage market (Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000). Second, parents have least influence on their children choices of mate selection which highly contributes to the openness of western societies. However, south Asia has lesser number of coeducational institutes, and parents have higher control on partner selection process for their children, particularly for females (Allendorf & Thornton, 2015; Desai & Andrist, 2010; Ghimire *et al.*, 2006). Such availability of coeducational institutes reduces the chances of selecting a partner by choice of children with similar education. The higher control of parents on selecting a partner for children decreases the probability of exogamy (marriage out of family) and free marriage market because parents prefer to perpetuate their bloodline which increases the chances of endogamy (marriage within family). It reveals the propensity of homogamy in western and Asian societies, but these societies are distinctive in preferences of mate section characteristics e.g., ethnicity, caste and occupation.

Although consanguinity or in-caste marriages are widely practiced in south Asia, recent studies

revealed that educational and occupational homogamy are also increasing (Farooq *et al*., 2015; Jones, 2010). This showed that two modes of homogamy i.e., cultural and exchange, existed in South Asia simultaneously. The cultural mode of homogamy (CMH) refers to the preference of caste, ethnicity, language, etc., in selecting a partner in a marriage market to sustain these cultural characteristics. The exchange mode of homogamy (EMH) implies the preference of potential assets i.e., education, occupation, wealth, socioeconomic status, etc., in selecting a partner to perpetuate or enhance the relative social position in a society. We proposed that each mode of homogamy reproduces its corresponding elements e.g., CMH reproduces ethnicity and EMH perpetuates socioeconomic status across generations. These modes of homogamy are the strategies of social reproduction (Bourdieu, 1990, 1996; Weber, 1978; Mills, 1956). Previous studies evidenced the prevalence of CMH in Pakistan (Agha, 2016; Hussain, 1999; Hussain & Bittles, 1998; Makino, 2018; Shami *et al*., 1994; Usman & Amjad, 2013). However, firstly, such studies primarily focused on endogamy, consanguinity and correlates of marriage e.g., violence (Ali *et al*., 2011; Murshid, 2017; Nasrullah *et al*., 2014) and decision-making (Hamid *et al*., 2011; Naz *et al*., 2017). Secondly, although social reproduction was studied in the country (e.g., Ullah & Skelton, 2016), but marriage as one of its strategies has been neglected. Thirdly, reproduction by modes of homogamy has rarely been focused. Therefore, this study explored the role of homogamy in social reproduction. The study further probed the role of occupation and education in CMH. The study is also extended across three data sets of

PDHS (1990 to 2013) so that the role of occupation and education of women in CMH and social reproduction could be comprehended profoundly. This analysis also signifies the co-existence of ethnic and social reproduction within the marriage market of Pakistan.

1.1 Reproduction and Marriage

The choice of selecting a partner is a choice of social reproduction through marriage. Weber (1978) and Bourdieu (1996) claimed that marriage is one of the strategies of social closure and social reproduction, respectively. They also claimed that marriage is all about economic and symbolic interests –enhancing or maintaining economic status and honour across generations (Lamaison, 1986).

Weber's (1922/1946) theory of social stratification signified the strategy of connubial relationship for the reproduction of power, privilege, prestige and wealth by forming a social closure. The closure refers to the process of constructing social circle(s) in order to monopolize scarce resources for the interests of the members of the circle(s). Such closure supports established stratification by restricting others to enter the circle(s) (Mackert, 2012). Stände are such circles of monopolization. They are characterized by exclusivity which represents symbolic cohesion, superiority and distance from others. Such characteristics of Stände, construct circles of cultural exclusivity which can be reproduced through matrimonial strategy e.g., marrying within similar Stände (Weber, 1922/1946). Therefore, homogamy can be perceived as "a form of group closure" (Kalmijn, 1998, p. 396). Furthermore, theories of marriage (Becker, 1973, 1974, 1981) and reproduction through marriage (Bourdieu, 1984,

1996) primarily focused on educational and occupational resources to explain the underlying structure of marriage market, process of partner selection and reproduction of the structure of inequality.

Although, Becker (1973, 1974) and Bourdieu (1996) acknowledged profitable returns from marital alliance, but they are different on epistemological grounds i.e., rational action and habitus. The rational action theory preaches reasonable actions, but habitus exposes passivity of actors because it is defined as the ingrained, durable and predisposed dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977). The profitable returns in Becker's (1974) analysis signified economic dimension. However, Bourdieu (1984, 1986, 1990, 1996) criticized economic reductionism and extended his analysis to other forms of profitable returns. He claimed that misalliance– marrying above or below the rank of family (Bourdieu, 1990; 1996) – is commonly prohibited (Bourdieu, 1996) because it can damage the honour of a family. Therefore, marrying within similar rank of family is a strategy of protecting its relative social position in the structural distribution of positions. Such marital alliance is the protection of established social hierarchies (Bourdieu 1996). Thus, marriage as a strategy to perpetuate the family rank across generations is the sustainability of the social structure of differentiation. Such sustainability protects and enhances wealth and power of a family. He claimed that when a strategy becomes unsuccessful, agents prefer to invest in alternative strategies (Bourdieu, 1984, 1990, 1996).

For example, preference of educational strategy on matrimonial strategy. Mills (1956) also studied marriage pattern of power elite: the political, economic and military men. He stated that power elite have been marrying within their power circles which, as one of the strategies, reproduced their social status across generations. Like Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 1996), he stated that they have similar socialisation and social origin e.g., education and occupation (Mills, 1956). Like Weber (1922/1946), he assented that the power elite has been using connubial relationship to reproduce power within their circles (Mills, 1956).

1.2 Reproduction and Modes of Homogamy

Several theorists argued that education is a prime factor of social reproduction (Althusser, 1971/2014; Bernstein, 1977; Bourdieu, 1984, 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Bowles & Gintis, 1976). Althusser (1971/2014) and Bowles and Gintis (1976) filled the gap of economic reproduction in Marxist theory by incorporating educational system in the reproduction of capitalist relations. They argued that education system reproduced labour power to be exploited in capitalism. The correspondence principle of Bowles and Gintis (1976) introduced a relationship between education and occupation in terms of the reproduction of social hierarchies. This principle stated that individuals are socialized in educational institutes in accordance with the demands of capitalist market. Althusser (1971/2014) also pointed out that educational system (the dominant ideological apparatus) aimed to reproduce established social hierarchies. Similarly, Bernstein (1977) claimed that schools reproduced inequality. Bourdieu developed his reproduction theory by extending Weber's theory of stratification and Marx's theory of capitals (Brubaker, 1985). He

defined social reproduction as "reproduction of relations between classes" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). Educational system reproduces these relations by reproducing labour with highbrow cultural capital which is exclusive behaviour, material possessions and dispositions of upper class. The reproduction of labour with highbrow and lowbrow cultural capital contributes to perpetuating the relative positions of agents in the social space of positions (Bourdieu, 1984). Thus, educational meritocracy is a "myth" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 5; Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p. 269) because schools prefer to enrol and retain those students who have already accumulated highbrow cultural capital (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Karabel, 2005). This theory has been supported by several studies (Cheadle, 2008; Crook, 1997; DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Dumais, 2002; Farkas *et al*., 1990; De Graaf *et al*., 2000; Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1996; Katsillis & Rubinson, 1990; Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Van de Werfhorst & Hofstede, 2007). In order to reveal the relationship between homogamy and reproduction, Bavel (2012) stated that "Understanding educational assortative mating is essential to understand the reproduction of social inequality in modern societies" (p. 133). Previous studies revealed that education is a prime factor of reproduction of inequality (Mare, 2000). Therefore, it has a key importance in studying educational homogamy (Nielsen & Svarer, 2009) in relation with the reproduction of inequality (Kalmijn, 1998). Hayes and Jones (1991) concluded that "despite the expansion of educational opportunity since the Second World War, social closure rather than social fluidity in terms of marital choice remains the dominant trend, especially at the extremes of the educational hierarchy" (p. 13). Evidence showed that parents prefer prestigious educational institutes for their children to perpetuate their social positions across generation (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Bourdieu, 1984, 1990, 1996; Scott, 1965), and, interestingly, majority of the individuals met with their partners in educational institutes (Fu & Heaton, 2008; Kalmijn & Flap, 2001; Mills, 1956). Therefore, these institutions became a potential marriage market, especially for educational homogamy (Nielsen & Svarer, 2009). Thus, educational institute and educational homogamy are indispensable to study social reproduction. Educational homogamy accrues cultural and economic resources of a couple (Blossfeld, 2009). It not only contributes to maintaining the relative cultural and economic position of a couple, but it also increases the chances of higher cultural and economic status of their children (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996; Hwang *et al*., 1995). This indicates that educational homogamy supports the perpetuation of social positions of agents across generations. Therefore, the increasing educational homogamy in Western marriage market is strengthening the reproduction of inequality and openness of the society (Blackwell & Lichter, 2000, 2004; Domański & Przybysz, 2007; Hamplova, 2009; Kalmijn, 1991a, 1991b, 1998; Mare, 1991; Qian & Preston, 1993; Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz & Mare, 2005; Smits *et al*., 1999; Ultee & Luijkx, 1990). Like educational homogamy, chronological review of previous studies also evidenced the prevalence of occupational homogamy in western societies. O'Higgins (1982) explored that individuals preferred to marry within their occupational groups.

Hout (1982) found the symmetrical relationship between occupation of husband and wife. Hayes (1993) explored significant positive interaction between occupation of husband and wife. Smits *et al.* (1999) concluded that patterns of occupational homogamy are almost similar across eight European countries. Like Hout (1982), they also explored an overrepresentation of couples in same occupational group. Like O'Higgins (1982), Schumacher and Lorenzetti (2005) found highest prevalence of occupational homogamy across extreme ends of social hierarchies. They explored that highest and lowest level occupations (i.e., professionals and factory workers, respectively) have highest parameters of occupational homogamy. Interestingly, the homogamy at extremes of educational hierarchies has also been evidenced by Hayes and Jones (1991) which showed the interrelationship of education and occupation in terms of homogamy. Classical and recent studies established the fact that education and occupation are interrelated because the former provided higher chances of employment and the latter increased the probability of higher socioeconomic status (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Bourdieu, 1984, 1996; Sinclair *et al.*, 1977; Karabel, 2005; Krippner, 1963). Therefore, occupational and educational homogamy increase the probability of reproduction of established social hierarchies across generations. Further, the evidence of stability of the homogamy also supported the proposition of reproduction of social hierarchies (Amato *et al.*, 2007; Cutrona *et al.*, 2003; Rauer *et al.*, 2008; Stanley *et al.*, 2006). Jones (1987) stated that homogamy potentially contributed to formation of social hierarchy. Thus, we hypothesized that these

potential assets determine the exchange mode of homogamy because they determine the socioeconomic status and class of agents (Bourdieu, 1984; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 1980; Goldthorpe & Hope, 1974; Wright, 1979; Wright & Perrone, 1977). Although, education has been stated as a vital factor of marital selection among women (Ganguli *et al.*, 2014; Kalmijn, 1994; Smits & Park, 2009) yet occupation has not been neglected in Asian countries (Banerjee *et al.*, 2013; Chowdhury & Trovato, 1994). However, these factors have least importance in consanguinity especially in rural areas where ethnicity or caste is the most important factor of marital selection (Agha, 2016; Hussain, 1999; Hussain & Bittles, 1998; Shami *et al.*, 1994) because consanguinity does not aim to reproduce structure of social positions. Therefore, we also hypothesized that ethnicity is a more important determinant of consanguinity than occupation and education. Although, empirical findings of various studies supported the theoretical assertions of homogamy (e.g., DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Hu & Qian, 2016) but they neglected the simultaneous determinants of reproduction and consanguinity in a marriage market. This study attempted to deal with these determinants in Pakistani marriage market. Such analysis signified the role of CMH and EMH in social reproduction.

2. Data and Methods

We selected married women (age 14 – 49) from 1990–91 (N = 6281, Weighted M_{age}= 31.18), 2006–07 (N = 9982, Weighted M_{age}= 32.37) and 2012–13 (N = 13506, Weighted M_{age}= 32.51) surveys of PDHS. The surveys used complex sampling design. Therefore, data were weighted as per recommended

procedure of PDHS. The predictor and outcome variables are mentioned in table 2. Occupation is operationalized by occupational groups of husbands x_j and wives x_i. PDHS measured over 99 occupational titles of respondents and grouped them according to the categories of International Standards Classification of Occupations (ISCO). In the data of 2006-07, the category agricultural self-employed of the variable women's occupation has zero response, therefore, the category agricultural self-employed (n = 07) of the variable 'Husband's Occupation' was merged into agricultural employee to form the same categories for wives and husbands. Resultantly, the values of variables x_i and x_j became $1 \leq i \leq 9$ and $1 \leq j \leq 9$, respectively. To define outcome variables, the method of Kalmijn (1994) was used. Occupation of a wife x_i and husband x_j ($1 \leq i \leq 10$ and $1 \leq j \leq 10$), if satisfies the condition $i = j$ then the first dependent variable would be $O_i = 1$. However, if $i \neq j$, then $O_i = 0$. Here, occupational homogamy refers to marriage within same occupational group. Therefore, statistically $O_i = 1$ refers to occupational homogamy and $O_i = 0$ refers to otherwise ($0 \leq i \leq 1$). Education is operationalized by education level of wife y_i and husband y_j ($1 \leq i \leq 4$ and $1 \leq j \leq 4$). Like occupational homogamy, if y_i and y_j satisfies the condition $i = j$, then $C_i = 1$ refers to educational homogamy. However, if $i \neq j$, then $C_i = 0$ refers to otherwise. Kalmijn (1994) used this procedure for log linear modelling, but we intended to use exchange and cultural modes of homogamy as outcome variables in order to predict trends of these variables across multiple periods, which directed us to use Binary Logistic Model. This model is a special case of log linear model and identical to Log linear Model of Homogenous Groups (Agresti, 2007; Eye & Munn, 2013). Therefore, two by two sub-tables for each category of occupational and educational groups are constructed. The method to construct two by two table for each category is described in table 1.

Table 1: Procedure to create two by two sub-table

Variable		Professional	
		$x_i = 1$	$x_i = 0$
Occupational Homogamy	$O_i = 1$	D_{ij}	$(\sum D_{ij}) - D_{ij}$
	$O_i = 0$	$M_i - D_{ij}$	$(M_i - D_{ij}) - \sum(M_i - D_{ij})$

Note: The marginal total of the given variables can be found using the following equation:

$O_i = 1$: $D_{ij} + [(\sum D_{ij}) - D_{ij}]$; $O_i = 0$: $(M_i - D_{ij}) + [(M_i - D_{ij}) - \sum(M_i - D_{ij})]$; $x_i = 1$: $D_{ij} + (M_i - D_{ij})$; $x_i = 0$: $[(\sum D_{ij}) - D_{ij}] + [(M_i - D_{ij}) - \sum(M_i - D_{ij})]$. Grand total $\sum\sum T$ is sum of the marginal totals.

Where:

D_{ij} = observed frequencies in diagonal ith row and jth column (of larger cross table of husband-wife occupational status).

$\sum D_{ij}$ = sum of all diagonal ith rows' and jth columns' observed frequencies.

M_i = Marginal total of ith row.

By using the method given in table 1, odd ratios for homogamy across educational and occupational groups can be computed through an equation:

$$\theta = \frac{P_{D_{ij}/(M_i-D_{ij})}}{N_{D_{ij}/(M_i-D_{ij})}}$$

Where, $P_{D_{ij}/(M_i-D_{ij})}$ computes odds of occupational homogamy among professional/technician/manager group (henceforth professional) and $N_{D_{ij}/(M_i-D_{ij})}$ measures odds of occupational homogamy among 'Not working' group. Keeping the denominator same, we changed odds of occupational group to set 'Not Working' as reference category. The same method is applied to measure odd ratios of educational homogamy for each educational category. The variable consanguinity was available in the data. Therefore, to operationalize consanguinity, a different technique is applied. In survey 2012-13, consanguinity is operationalized by a dummy variable that measured wife's blood relation with husband on a dichotomous scale, Yes = 1 and No = 0. However, this dichotomous dummy variable is not available in other two surveys. In the survey 1990-91 and 2006-07, question on blood relation with husband (measured on five categories) is selected to develop a dummy variable of consanguinity. Those women who married with their first cousin (either on father or mother side) are coded as 1 = Consanguineous marriage, and 0 = otherwise. Lastly, educational and occupational homogamy were selected as proxy variable for EMH, and

consanguinity as proxy variable for CMH. Standard women occupational groups ranged from 1 = professional to 10 = unemployed, and educational groups ranged from 1 = High education to 4 = No education, were used as predictors of social reproduction through marriage. Age is classified in seven categories (1 = 15-19 to 7 = 45-49). Variable region depicted provinces and capital city, 1 = Punjab to 6 = Islamabad (ICT). Variable type of place measured rural-urban distinction (1= Urban, 2 = Rural). PDHS measured more than 19 ethnic groups and most of these ethnic groups have zero percent count, therefore, insignificant ethnic groups were merged in the category 96 = others, in 2006-07 and 2012-13 surveys. The significant ethnic groups (e.g., Punjabi and Sindhi) were given their original codes (1 = Urdu to 10 = Other). These codes were used as standard codes for all surveys. Lastly, wealth index was selected as a proxy variable for economic class in Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (see figure 2a and 2b). To identify predictability of the models, we used logistic regression through complex samples available in SPSS version 20. MCA was used to assess the co-existence of ethnic and social reproduction.

3. Results

Table 2 showed association matrix of EMH, CMH and women's demographic characteristics. All demographic characteristics are significantly associated with outcome variables ($p<.001$; $p<.05$). As expected, ethnicity has stronger association with consanguinity in 2006-07 and 2012-13, and occupational groups have stronger association with occupational homogamy than consanguinity in all surveys. Similarly, educational groups have stronger

association with educational homogamy than occupational homogamy and consanguinity. Moreover, association among outcome variables showed that in 1990-01 and 2006-07 occupational homogamy is not significantly associated with consanguinity ($p>.05$) but in 2012-13 it has almost similar association with educational homogamy and consanguinity ($p<.001$).

Table 2: Association matrix of demographic variables, predictors and outcomes

Variable	1990-01	2006-07	2012-13
	f (weighted %)	f (weighted %)	f (weighted %)
Age			
15-19	382 (6.4)	576 (5.7)	565 (4.5)
20-24	1023 (16.1)	1555 (15)	2040 (15.6)
25-29	1401 (22.6)	2006 (20.1)	2716 (20.1)
30-34	1132 (17.9)	1705 (17.8)	2426 (18.6)
35-39	985 (15)	1641 (16.5)	2288 (16.4)
40-44	777 (12.8)	1278 (13)	1803 (13)
45-49	581 (9.3)	1221 (12)	1668 (11.8)
Exchange modes of Homogamy			
Occupational homogamy	$\chi^2(6) = 17.64*$	$\chi^2(6) = 52.79**$	$\chi^2(6) = 26.54**$
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(6) = 59.29**$	$\chi^2(6) = 60.43**$	$\chi^2(6) = 18.46*$
Cultural mode homogamy			
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(6) = 29.74**$	$\chi^2(6) = 41.65**$	$\chi^2(6) = 50.02**$
Region			
Punjab	2125 (59.9)	4250 (58)	3788 (57.5)
Sindh	1711 (23)	2695 (23.9)	2927 (23.1)
KPK[a]	1581 (13.3)	1857 (13.5)	2685 (14.1)
Balochistan	864 (3.8)	1180 (4.6)	1949(4.2)
G. Baltistan			1215 (0.7)
Islamabad			942 (0.5)
Exchange modes of homogamy			
Occupational homogamy	$\chi^2(3) = 20.38**$	$\chi^2(3) = 57.60**$	$\chi^2(5) = 125.22**$
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(3) = 39.65**$	$\chi^2(3) = 24.39**$	$\chi^2(5) = 58.78**$
Cultural mode of homogamy			
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(3) = 60.54**$	$\chi^2(3) = 69.12**$	$\chi^2(5) = 53.59**$
Type of Place			
Urban	3194 (30.4)	3813 (33.4)	6325 (33.4)
Rural	3087 (69.6)	6169 (66.6)	7181 (66.6)
Exchange modes of homogamy			
Occupational homogamy	$\chi^2(1) = 6.94*$	$\chi^2(1) = 82.64**$	$\chi^2(1) =$

			249.58**
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(1) = 68.56$**	$\chi^2(1) = 0.017$	$\chi^2(1) = 5.13$*
Cultural mode of homogamy			
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(1) = 94.77$**	$\chi^2(1) = 175.66$**	$\chi^2(1) = 411.69$**
Ethnic groups			
Urdu		732 (8)	1280 (9.6)
Punjabi		3087 (41.3)	3050 (38.5)
Sindhi		1306 (10.4)	1273 (8.9)
Pushto		2052 (13.7)	2931 (13.3)
Balochi		560 (3.5)	596 (4)
Brahui		159 (0.8)	569 (1.9)
Siraiki		1367 (15.6)	1336 (15.3)
Hindko		280 (2.8)	548 (3.2)
Other		439 (3.8)	1918 (5.4)
Exchange modes of homogamy			
Occupational homogamy		$\chi^2(8) = 186.42$**	$\chi^2(8) = 516.04$**
Educational homogamy		$\chi^2(8) = 74.21$**	$\chi^2(8) = 78.75$**
Cultural mode of homogamy			
Consanguinity		$\chi^2(8) = 486.89$**	$\chi^2(8) = 1053.7$**
Education			
Primary	567 (9)	1339 (14.2)	1824 (15.9)
Secondary	791 (10.5)	1339 (14.2)	2408 (17.8)
Higher	110 (1.1)	664 (6.5)	1677 (9.3)
No Education	4813 (79.5)	6640 (65)	7597 (57)
Exchange modes of homogamy			
Occupational homogamy	$\chi^2(3) = 23.27$**	$\chi^2(3) = 115.91$**	$\chi^2(3) = 396.93$**
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(3) = 321.45$**	$\chi^2(3) = 558.72$**	$\chi^2(3) = 852.79$**
Cultural mode of homogamy			
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(3) = 80.33$**	$\chi^2(3) = 135.04$**	$\chi^2(3) = 376.15$**
Occupation			
Prof./Tech./Mang.	80 (1.1)	244 (2.4)	390 (2.3)
Clerical	9 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	7 (0.0)
Sales	15 (0.4)	68 (0.6)	69 (0.7)
Agri. self employed	133 (2.9)	-	4 (0.0)
Agri. employee	119 (3.7)	1066 (12.6)	784 (10.6)
Household	25 (0.4)	114 (1.1)	120 (1.0)
Services	24 (0.4)	1181 (10.6)	845 (6.9)

Skilled manual	508 (6.5)	71 (0.7)	160 (1.7)
Unskilled manual	90 (1.4)	183 (1.9)	577 (5.8)
Not working	5278 (83.1)	7049 (70)	10550 (71)
Exchange modes of homogamy			
Occupational homogamy	$\chi^2(9) = 1838.5**$	$\chi^2(8) = 2235.2**$	$\chi^2(9) = 4635.7**$
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(9) = 55.64**$	$\chi^2(8) = 141.91**$	$\chi^2(9) = 182.43**$
Cultural mode of homogamy			
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(9) = 29.56*$	$\chi^2(8) = 41.19**$	$\chi^2(9) = 288.37**$
Occupational Homogamy			
$O_i = 1$	458 (7.5)	1199 (12.3)	1487 (13.4)
$O_i = 0$	5823 (92.5)	8783 (87.7)	12019 (86.6)
Educational homogamy	$\chi^2(1) = 6.41*$	$\chi^2(1) = 43.28*$	$\chi^2(1) = 58.8**$
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(1) = 0.22$	$\chi^2(1) = 3.099$	$\chi^2(1) = 55.4**$
Educational Homogamy			
$C_i = 1$	3398 (57)	4704 (46.7)	6424 (46.9)
$C_i = 0$	2883 (43)	5278 (53.3)	7082 (53.1)
Consanguinity	$\chi^2(1) = 32.39**$	$\chi^2(1) = 5.81*$	$\chi^2(1) = 33.30**$
Consanguinity			
Yes	2921 (50.1)	5056 (52.4)	8349 (65.3)
No	3355 (49.8)	4919 (47.5)	5149 (34.6)
Total	6281 (100)	9982 (100)	13506 (100)

Note: **. $p<.001$, *. $p<.05$. [a]North-West Frontier is now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)

It was explored that the prevalence of CMH increased by two percent in 2006-07, and 15 percent in rural and 13 percent in urban areas in 2012-13 comparing with 1990-01. Occupational


Figure 1. Percentage distribution of modes of homogamy from 1990 to 2013.

in 2012-13 comparing with 1990-01. It increased 17 homogamy was 7.5 percent in 1990-01 which

increased by six percent in 2012-13. However, it was 43 percent less than the prevalence of CMH in 1990-01 that reached up to 52 percent in 2012-13. Although, CMH was seven percent less than the prevalence of educational homogamy in 1990-01, it became six percent higher in 2006-07. Within next five years, it had the highest percentage (65.4 percent) in the country (see figure 1). One of the interesting findings of the study is consecutive decline in educational homogamy from 1990-01 to 2012-13. It decreased 10 percent between 1990-01 and 2006-07. However, no significant change was observed in the next five years (0.2 percent

increased). From 1990-01 to 2012-13, it decreased five percent in Sindh, 12 percent in Punjab, 10.3 percent in KPK and 19.4 percent in Balochistan. By type of place, it declined more in rural (14 percent) than urban areas (almost one percent) in 16 years. It showed that although educational homogamy was prevalent in 1990s but CMH became the most prevalent marital strategy in 21st century, especially in rural areas. It also signified that marital strategies vary by geography and age. The following section describes trends and diversity of marital strategies within occupational, educational and ethnic groups.

Table 3: Odd ratios and adjusted odd ratios for occupational homogamy, educational homogamy and consanguinity

	Exchange modes of homogamy				Cultural mode of homogamy	
	Occupational homogamy		Educational homogamy		Consanguinity	
Predictors	OR	AOR[a]	OR	AOR[a]	OR	AOR[b]
1990-01						
Occupation						
Professional	21.37**	20.47**	1.91*	2.15*	0.46*	0.55
Clerical	21.94*	27.02*	1.58	1.75	0.41	0.41
Sales	70.80**	78.68**	1.09	1.01	0.98	0.97
Agri. self employed	114.81**	194.89**	2.43**	1.96*	1.48	1.19
Agri. Employee	9.22**	11.93**	1.76*	1.59*	1.37	1.06
Household	1.74	1.77	1.68	1.59	1.19	1.32
Services	26.24**	30.83**	1.19	1.19	1.42	1.37
Skilled manual	17.28**	23.86**	0.91	0.83	1.27	1.22
Unskilled manual	21.51**	26.27**	1.66*	1.55	0.92	0.86
Not working	1					
Education						
Primary					0.84	0.86
Secondary					0.56**	0.66*
Higher					0.18**	0.23**

No education					1	

2006-07

Occupation

Professional	12.71**	14.35**	2.28**	2.16**	0.78	0.87
Clerical	10.52*	10.19*	13.21*	12.33*	0.62	0.89
Sales	10.89**	10.59**	0.65	.65	0.86	0.82
Agri. employee	21.92**	22.39**	1.68**	1.67**	1.41*	0.94
Household	0.51	0.496	2.78**	2.62**	1.09	1.09
Services	3.57**	3.64**	1.04	0.98	1.15	0.87
Skilled manual	20.56**	21.77**	0.90	0.79	0.77	0.70
Unskilled manual	12.64**	13.09**	1.45*	1.43*	1.14	0.89
Not working	1					

Education

Primary					0.79*	0.86*
Secondary					0.62**	0.81*
Higher					0.46**	0.69*
No education					1	

Ethnicity

Urdu					0.87	1.12
Punjabi					1.98**	1.91*
Sindhi					4.08**	3.69**
Pushto					1.47**	2.21**
Balochi					3.46*	3.76**
Barauhi					2.89**	3.25**
Siraiki					3.73**	3.36**
Hindko					2.54**	3.81**
Others					1	

2012-13

Occupation

Professional	17.48**	22.84**	2.76**	2.74**	0.65*	0.69*
Clerical	1.49	2.03	0.94	0.85	2.16	2.08
Sales	21.49**	27.31**	1.05	1.08	1.14	1.27
Agri. self employed	66.69*	60.56*	0.67	0.70	24.86*	25.43*
Agri. employee	34.85**	36.78**	1.49**	1.65**	2.93**	1.67*
Household	0.79	0.97	2.44**	2.52**	0.87	0.92
Services	5.09**	6.16**	0.84*	0.85	1.26*	1.01

Skilled manual	123.13**	139.62**	1.84*	1.75*	1.72	1.19
Unskilled manual	45.92**	52.85**	1.47**	1.57**	1.56*	1.25
Not working	1				
Education					
Primary					0.81*	0.94
Secondary					0.53**	0.71**
Higher					0.37**	0.54**
No education					1	
Ethnicity					
Urdu					1.34	1.98*
Punjabi					2.33**	2.39**
Sindhi					6.56**	6.37**
Pushto					2.09**	2.51*
Balochi					16.59**	13.89**
Barauhi					4.63**	4.91**
Siraiki					7.19**	6.31**
Hindko					2.39**	3.04**
Others					1	

Note: **. $p<.001$, *. $p<.05$; the code 1 represents reference category

[a]Adjusted for age, region, type of place and ethnicity of women; ethnicity was not available in 1990-01 survey
[b]Adjusted for age, region, type of place, occupation and educational

Table 4: Description of logistic models

	1990-01			2006-07			2012-13		
Model	**Pseudo R²**	**WF[a]**	**PC%[b]**	**Pseudo R²**	**WF**	**PC %**	**Pseudo R²**	**WF**	**PC %**
Exchange mode of homogamy									
Occupational homogamy									
Occupation	0.38	53.19**	93.8	0.308	112.71**	87.7	0.446	118.24**	88.2
AOC[d]	0.396	44.317**	93.7	0.323	109.23**	88.1	0.461	88.787**	89
Educational homogamy									
Occupation	0.012	16.23**	57	0.019	10.6**	56.4	0.018	0.0197**	56
AOC	0.045	2.796*	57.7	0.037	10.25**	57.5	0.031	11.28**	57.2

Cultural mode of homogamy

Consanguinity

Occupation	0.006	2.01*	51.7	0.006	2.57*	52.8	0.032	6.417**	65.4
AOC	0.044	0.97	58.7	0.084	0.588	60.6	0.133	3.248*	67
Education	0.018	17.967**	53.7	0.018	26.28**	55.7	0.037	101.78**	66
AED[e]	0.050	9.28**	59.1	0.085	4.330*	60.6	0.136	14.99**	67
Ethnic group				0.065	34.88**	58.5	0.111	41.72**	66.8
AET[f]				.087	18.91**	60.7	0.14	17.57**	67

*Note:** p<.001, *. p<.05*

[a]Wald F, Wald statistic is of main variable only in models adjusted for other variables, [b]Predicted Classification, [d]Occupation adjusted for other variables, [e]Educational adjusted for other variables, [f]Ethnicity adjusted for other variables

Table 3 showed that agricultural self-employed (OR = 114) and sales group (OR = 70.8) married within their occupational groups, even adjusting for other variables in 1991-01 (OR = 194.8 and 78.6, respectively). All other occupational groups are also significantly related with occupational homogamy (*p*>.05, for description of models see table 4). In 2006-07, skilled manual (OR = 20.5 and AOR = 21.7) and agricultural self-employed had almost similar (and highest) odd ratios for occupational homogamy (OR = 21.9 and AOR = 22.3). Services group had lowest odd ratio (3.5 and 3.6, respectively) in 1990-01. In 2012-13, the trends of occupational homogamy among various occupational groups significantly changed because skilled manual had highest odd ratio (OR = 123.1 and AOR = 139.6) in this period and the adjusted odd ratio of agricultural self-employed decreased from 66.6 to 60.5. Moreover, in 1990-01 and 2006-

7, household group was statistically insignificant except for educational homogamy. In 2012-13, clerical group was statistically insignificant even adjusting for other variables. Although, the prevalence of occupational homogamy was statistically significant among almost all occupational groups, but its tendency decreased in 2006-07. The adjusted odd ratio of clerical (AOR =27) and sales group (AOR = 78.6) decreased to AOR = 10. Similarly, AORs of professional, services and unskilled manual groups declined by 14.3, 10.5 and 13 OR, respectively. However, the tendency of this homogamy increased among agricultural employees only (from AOR = 11.9 to AOR = 22.3). This increase could be less valid because agricultural self-employed was combined with agricultural employee in the data set of 2006-07. Interestingly, the tendency of occupational homogamy increased in 2012-13, but variations in

this homogamy among occupational groups is evident because the homogamy increased among all occupational groups except clerical. In 1990-01, only professional (AOR = 1.9), agricultural self-employed (AOR = 2.4) and employee groups (AOR = 1.7) married within their educational groups. However, in 2006-07, clerical group (AOR =12.3), household and domestic group (AOR = 2.6) and unskilled manual group (AOR = 1.4) preferred educational homogamy. The skilled manual also preferred this homogamy (AOR = 1.7) in 2012-13 but this trend significantly declined in clerical and agricultural self-employed group. As far as CMH is concerned, it was not significantly related with occupational groups. The chances of interaction between occupational group and consanguinity is higher in rural areas due to the prevalence of consanguinity (Hussain & Bittles, 1998), therefore, agricultural self-employed (AOR = 25.5) and employee (AOR = 1.6) were associated with CMH. Almost all ethnic groups married within their family except Urdu in 2006-07 which also contributed significantly to 2012-13 model. In 2006-07, all ethnic groups had almost similar odd ratios i.e., AOR ≥ 3, except Punjabi (AOR = 1.9) and Pushto (AOR = 2.2). However, Balochi had the highest OR (16.6) and AOR (13.89) of CMH in 2012-13. Overall, the tendency of CMH increased in 2012-13 comparing with 2006-07. Lastly, wealth index from the analysis was excluded because it did not significantly predict EMH and CMH in all models.

4. Discussion & Conclusion: This study aimed to evaluate two propositions. First, exchange and cultural modes of homogamy reproduce the established social and ethnic hierarchies within a marriage market, respectively. Second, these modes coexist in the marriage market of Pakistan as strategies of social reproduction. Other than occupation of women, education and ethnicity were included in CMH models while hypothesizing that ethnicity is its stronger predictor than occupation and education. Theory of social reproduction considers marriage as one of the most important strategies of social reproduction because individuals marry within similar status group in order to perpetuate their relative social positions in the social space of positions (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Weber, 1978; Mills, 1956). Furthermore, such strategy also enhances symbolic power of spouses, particularly spouse with privileged background. Our findings showed that such selection patterns are important for less privileged than privileged groups such as agricultural self-employees are highly likely to marry within same occupational group. This finding supports the study of Hout (1982), O'Higgins (1982) and Schumacher and Lorenzetti (2005). As expected, women with lower occupational group (e.g., agricultural employee, see Nakhaie, 1996) married within same status group. This finding is consistent with the study of Kalmijn (1994). However, in terms of educational group, this result is contrary to the findings of Hayes and Jones (1991) and Mäenpää, and Jalovaara (2015). In other words, this finding is contrary to the upward mobility studies which proposed that people with lower status can enhance their status by marrying in higher status group. However, these studies neglected the depreciation in

symbolic power by marrying in higher status group and focused only on substantive matter i.e., economic or cultural. Weber (1922/1946), Mills (1956) and Bourdieu (1996) asserted that individuals with higher occupation prefer to marry within their status group. This study supported their proposition as well as the misalliance principle of Bourdieu. Therefore, it is concluded that families from higher occupation group not only reproduced their social status by avoiding misalliance, but they also reproduced their symbolic power as well. Although, this study supported the proposition of misalliance yet the central proposition (i.e., perpetuation of upper class across generations) of Bourdieu (1984, 1986, 1990, 1996), Weber (1922/1946) and Mills (1956) was not consistent with this study because EMH was prevalent among lower-level occupations (see figure 2a and 2b). Therefore, the study supported occupational reproduction theory of Jonsson *et al*. (2009) which claimed that lower class (micro-class) reproduces itself which supports the reproduction of upper class (big class). One important finding of this study is variation in EMH which showed that in 2006-07 and 2012-13, the ratio of occupational homogamy decreased, and educational homogamy increased among different occupational groups. Although, this showed a gradual increase in the openness of Pakistani society but, as Smits *et al*. (1999) selected occupational homogamy as an indicator of openness, it also showed inverse order of EMH across occupational homogamy which revealed a decline in the openness. In terms of reproduction, one possible explanation of this inverse order could be the change in instruments of reproduction e.g., education system or marital law (Bourdieu 1984: 125). Bourdieu (1984) claimed that the strategies of reproduction change as the instruments of reproduction change. In this way, marriage market as instrument of social reproduction should be taken into account in relation with the trends of the marital alliance but, considering the findings of this study, it would not be valid to assert that change in instruments of reproduction caused change in homogamy because the analysis of this study included different age groups that certainly showed different time of marriage for each age group. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized in relation with instruments of social reproduction that is why it is suggested that future studies should incorporate instruments of reproduction. Consanguinity is widely practiced marriage strategy in Pakistan (Agha, 2016; Hussain, 1999) and this study argued that it is associated with reproduction of ethnicity. If it is to be considered as an indicator of social status (Shami *et al*., 1994), then it is also associated with status reproduction. In other words, ethnicity is a badge of social status which forms ethnic identity in Pakistan. However, if a woman marries outside the ethnic group, her ethnic identity will be diminished in her next generation e.g., if a Pushto woman marries with a Punjabi man; her children would be known as Punjabi. CMH restricts such ethnic extinction and provides the advantages of identity transformation to next

Figure 2a. Co-existence of ethnic and social reproduction (2006-07). Multiple Correspondence Analysis.

generation in a patriarchal structure. Therefore, consanguineous marital strategy facilitates the perpetuation of ethnic positions across generations. In Pakistani context, the finding of ethnic reproduction is consistent with the study of Hussain and Bittles (1998), and beyond the country, it supported the study of Hartung *et al*. (2011). The results showed the practice of different marital strategies within the marriage market of Pakistan which supported Bourdieu's argument that each group in a society does not use same strategy and degree of a strategy for reproduction. Moreover, if ethnicity is to be considered as a field: a field of ethnic relations, within a marriage market, then social relations of positions among agents of the field is the relations of their accumulated capitals. Therefore, ethnic identity is the most valued currency in ethnic field and can be used as a form of capital (Shah *et al*., 2010). Thus, it is concluded that

agents in the field of ethnicity used their ethnic identity as a capital to reproduce their ethnicity – CMH facilitated such reproduction. Although, the prevalence of social reproduction is lower than ethic reproduction, yet they co-existed within the marriage market which signified the diverse preferences of marital strategies and consumption of a most valued capital within a relevant field. This differentiates social reproduction from ethnic reproduction. The distinction is prominent (see figure 2a and 2b) because the currency of ethnic and other capitals cannot be consumed with the same value in each other's field. Therefore, assortative mating and homogamy theses can treat educational and occupational capital cumulatively due to their direct relation with economic capital in the market, but they cannot use ethnicity in the same way due to its distance from economic capital.

reproduction of social hierarchies on economic

Figure 2b. Co-existence of ethnic and social reproduction (2012-13). Multiple Correspondence Analysis.

Conclusively, ethnic capital did not reproduce social hierarchies on economic dimension, the occupational and educational capital are potential contributors of

dimension. Thus, we conclude that CMH reproduced ethnic hierarchies and EMH reproduced social hierarchies.

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